Domestic Relations by Ross, Hugh Alan
Case Western Reserve Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hugh Alan Ross, Domestic Relations, 10 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 394 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol10/iss3/14
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
delayed appeal. Not even a charge of unconstitutionality of a statute
will help sustain the granting of the writ when the questions raised by
the petitioner could have been determined on appeal. The writ may not
be used as a substitute for the appeal when the court had jurisdiction of
the crime and the person.135 Another defendant unsuccessfully urged the
voidness of the indictment to which he had pleaded guilty as justifying
the issuance of the writ.13 6 In a third petition the defendant urged errors
and irregularities committed during a trial at which he received a
sentence under the Habitual Criminal Act. These matters were fully
reviewable upon appeal. The per curiam opinion also comments that
the record discloses a proper disposition of the case under the statute, as




The attorney or trial judge who has to work in the area of interstate
divorce is severely handicapped by the fact that in many key areas the
United States Supreme Court has failed to clarify the law and has gone
to great lengths to avoid deciding important constitutional questions.'
While it is not an Ohio case, the recent Kovacs2 decision is worthy of
comment, both as an example of this tendency to duck constitutional is-
sues and as an illustration of a problem which has caused considerable
difficulty in the Ohio courts.
It is dear that where a child support or custody decree is subject to
modification in the state of rendition, it can later be modifieZa by an Ohio
court on a showing of change of circumstances.3 The rationale is that
Ohio does not have to give the foreign decree more "full faith and credit"
than it would be given in the state where rendered. A convincing argu-
ment can be made for the proposition that where the child and one par-
ent are domiciled in Ohio, the Ohio court can redetermine issues of cus-
tody and support without any showing of a change in circumstances since
the original out-of-state decree. The argument is that the policy basis
of a custody determination, "what is for the best interest of the child,'
outweighs the interest in certainty and finality of litigation, which is the
policy behind the full faith and credit clause.
135. In re Harley, 167 Ohio St. 48, 146 N.E.2d 121 (1957).
136. State v. Naples, 167 Ohio St. 530, 150 N.E.2d 36 (1958).
137. In re Arcieri, 167 Ohio St. 37, 146 N.E.2d 123 (1957).
[June
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958.
In the Kovacs case the Court refused to decide the question of
whether full faith and credit applied to a child custody decree and sent
the case back so the North Carolina court could expressly state whether
it had refused to follow a prior New York decree because of changed
circumstances, or whether the court was holding that the New York cus-
tody decree could be ignored in the absence of such a showing. Justice
Frankfurter dissented, on the ground that a temporary custody decree
should not be entitled to full faith and credit, and further, that by sending
the case back to the state court, the Court was impliedly deciding that
a change in circumstances was a constitutional requirement for non-recog-
nition, while at the same time expressly refusing to pass on the issue.
Divorce
1. Procedure
Since divorce is a matter of state concern, the Code provides that a
divorce judgment shall not be granted on the testimony or admissions of
a party unsupported by other evidence.4 Can a divorce be denied solely
on the admissions of a party? In the Dase case,5 the court answered in
the negative, and held that where the plaintiff failed to reply to an answer
which alleged condonation, the court could not dismiss the divorce action
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The same policy has impelled the Ohio Supreme Court to require that
divorce cases must be heard by the trial court in person, and issues of
law and fact cannot be turned over to a referee.' However, the lower
courts are not in agreement on the power of a divorce court to refer mo-
tions to modify prior alimony or child support decrees. One court held
1. The lack of clarification is not due to any paucity of cases. Prior to 1942, there
were less than half a dozen divorce cases decided by the Supreme Court. Since the
first Williams case, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), the Court has decided twenty cases in-
volving divorce, alimony, or child support decrees. For examples of cases in which
the Court went to extreme lengths to avoid passing on a constitutional question in a
domestic relations case, see Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956), com-
mented on in 1956 Survey, 8 WES'r. REs. L REv. 308 (1957); and Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
2. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
3. Assuming of course that Ohio has some connection with the child. Usually this
means that the child and one parent are domiciled in Ohio. New York ex rel. Hal-
vey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 166 Ohio St.
203, 141 N.E.2d 172 (1957), noted in 1957 Survey, 9 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 315
(1958).
4. OHIO REv. CODE § 3105.11.
5. Dase v. Dase, 152 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
6. State ex rel. Kleinman v. Cleveland, 118 Ohio St. 536, 161 N.E. 918 (1928).
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that this type of auxiliary proceeding could be referred, 7 and another
court held it could not.8 If such a motion can be referred, it is dear that
the referee is required to make written findings and recommendations.9
There were three cases on appellate procedure. Generally, the Ohio
Appellate Procedure Act requires an appeal bond for appeals on questions
of law -and fact and does not require a bond for appeals on questions of
law alone. However, the divorce chapter of the Code provides in rather
general terms that "an appeal to a higher court may be had upon the ap-
pellant's giving bond... ."10 The statute does not specify whether the
bond is required for both types of appeals, or only for those appeals
which are appeals on law and fact. In Volz v. Volz" the court held, in a 4
to 3 decision, that a bond was required in all appeals from a divorce
court, including an appeal from a decision refusing to modify a child
custody order. The two lower court decisions on appellate procedure
both held that a provisional order in a divorce proceeding is not appeal-
able.12
2. Alimony
It is quite common for a creditor of the husband and wife to file a
petition in the divorce court, or be interpleaded by the wife, so that the
joint debt can be paid by the husband as alimony. A recent case indi-
cates the importance to the wife of a decree which not only orders the
husband to pay the debt, but also orders him to save the wife harmless.
In the Fredericks case,13 the husband went into bankruptcy shortly after
the divorce. The court indicated that the part of the decree which re-
quired the husband to pay was a "debt" and dischargable, but the "save
harmless" clause was "alimony" and not dischargable in bankruptcy.
7. Hebdon v. Hebdon, 153 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); McGhee v. Mc-
Ghee, 152 N.E.2d 810 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 146 N.E.2d 151
(Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
8. Rider v. Rider, 152 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
9. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 146 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). See also CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw section, supra.
10. OHIO REV. CODE § 3109.07.
11. 167 Ohio St. 141, 146 N.E.2d 734 (1957).
12. Hedben v. Hedben, 152 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (order suspending
husband's obligation to make child support payments was not appealable where
order specified that payments would be made up if wife's appeal from a separate order
granting visitation rights to husband were sustained); Walcutt v. Walcutt, 146
N.E.2d 631 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (order requiring husband to vacate residence of
parties pending divorce action was an award of use of residence to wife as temporary
alimony and not appealable).
13. Fredericks v. Fredericks, 146 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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3. Child Support and Custody
There were two important cases of first impression in this area. In
Hackett v. Hackett,14 the parties executed an antenuptial agreement that
all children born of the marriage would be raised as Roman Catholics
and attend a parochial school. The parents later separated and provided
by a separation agreement that the mother (the non-Catholic) was to
have custody of the child and the child would attend a designated Catho-
lic school. The agreement, incorporated in a divorce decree, was violated
by the mother who enrolled the child in a public schooL The father's
motion to cite for contempt was dismissed. The court held that an agree-
ment that a child be educated in a particular faith is not enforceable
against the parent who has custody, even though the agreement is incor-
porated in a custody decree. Enforcement of such a decree would violate
the freedom of religion clause of the Ohio Constitution by interfering
with the religious freedom of the custodial parent. The result is in ac-
cord with other recent decisions on the constitutional issue of state con-
trol over religious training. 5 The court also emphasized that apart from
the constitutional arguments there are serious policy objections to the
enforcement of such a decree; that the part of the decree relating to gen-
eral religious training is difficult to enforce,", and that it conflicts with
the basic rule that the welfare of the child, rather than the rights of the
non-custodial parent, should be controlling. To create a religious con-
flict between the child and the custodian would be detrimental to the
mental and spiritual welfare of both.
The second major case was Robrock v. Robrock17 involving the juris-
diction of the divorce court in child custody cases. It is a familiar rule
that "parties cannot by agreement clothe the court with jurisdiction it
does not possess."' 8 In the domestic relations area the axiom has suffered
considerable erosion. The first setback occurred in the DeMilo case,' 9
decided in 1957. The Supreme Court held that a divorce court could
order installment alimony payments to run beyond the death of the hus-
band. The express holding was that a lump sum property settlement
14. 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), noted 72 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1958);
affirming 146 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio C.P. 1957); appeal as of tight denied, 168 Ohio
St. 373 (1958). See discussion in CONSTITIONAL LAW section, supra.
15. Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957); Boerger v. Boerger,
26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953). See Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing
of Children, 35 B.U.L. Rav. 333 (1955).
16. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956).
17. 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958), affirming 151 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1956).
18. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Hollenberger, 76 Ohio St. 177 (1907).
19. DeMilo v. Watson, 166 Ohio St. 433, 143 N.E.2d 707 (1957).
19591]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
could be made payable in installments extending beyond the death of the
obligor, which is dearly in accord with the weight of authority, but the
language of the court implied that an order for continuing alimony, not
based on a lump sum, could also extend beyond death. Limited to its
facts, the case also holds that such a decree is not subject to collateral
attack after the time for appeal has passed (i.e., that the court had juris-
diction), but the opinion dearly indicates that such a decree would not
be upset on a direct appeal.
The Robrock case 20 is the next step in expanding the jurisdiction of
the trial court in divorce matters. Like DeMilo, it was a collateral attack
on a decree which was brought by one of the parties to the divorce after
the appeal time had run. The Supreme Court held that a divorce court
has jurisdiction to incorporate in its decree a separation agreement which
requires the husband to support the children of the marriage beyond the
age of 21. The dissent pointed to numerous cases holding that a divorce
court has no power to order a husband to support his children beyond
minority, and argued that this power could not be conferred on the court
by agreement of the parties. The majority opinion dearly indicates that
the whole problem is not one of jurisdiction at all, and that any provision
in a contract can be incorporated into a divorce decree, even though the
contract creates obligations which the court would be powerless to create
by itself.
An incidental point worth noting is a statement in the court of ap-
peals' opinion to the effect that the law does not require a parent to fur-
nish a college education to his child as part of his duty of support.21 The
statement was dictum and was not discussed in the Supreme Court opin-
ion. There are opposing lines of authority on this issue and the question
is still open in Ohio.
4. Modification and Enforcement - Alimony, Custody and
Support Decrees
Three of the four cases in this area are cases where the litigation
could have been avoided by careful drafting of the separation agreement.
In the Riggle case22 the contract appeared to be collusive on its face, as
the husband agreed to make no defense against the divorce petition of
his wife. The agreement was incorporated in the decree and the court of
20. Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958). The decree
ordered the husband to maintain insurance policies on his life with the children
named as beneficiaries, and this arrangement was to continue beyond the minority
of the children. The decree also ordered the husband to pay the expense of a college
education for the children.
21. Robrock v. Robrock, 151 N.E.2d 234, 241 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
22. Riggle v. RiggIe, 148 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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appeals held that a collusive divorce is voidable rather than void, and the
husband could not plead the collusion as a defense to the wife's attempt
to enforce a support order.
The second case illustrates the importance of including an "anti-mer-
ger" clause in a separation agreement, where it is contemplated that the
agreement will be incorporated in a divorce decree. In the absence of
such a clause, the general rule is that the contract is merged in the decree,
so that the wife can no longer follow the defaulting husband from state
to state suing on the contract, but must sue on the decree, which some-
times means that she has to go back to the state of rendition in order to
have accrued installments reduced to a lump sum judgment. In Klassen
'V. Newell2 s the separation agreement was executed in New York, in-
corporated in a Nevada divorce decree, and sued on in Ohio. The court
applied the Ohio rule on merger, instead of the Nevada rule (the choice
of law problem was not raised by the parties) and denied enforcement of
the contract.
The third case which could have been solved by an appropriate clause
in the agreement was Miller v. Miller.24 The court held that where there
is no provision in a divorce decree for modification of child support pay-
ments, the payments could be reduced on a showing of change in circum-
stances, but could not be reduced if the decree was based on a separation
agreement which contained no such reservation. The court concluded
that Tullis v. Tdlis25 was still the law in Ohio, in spite of later Supreme
Court cases which express some doubt as to the validity of the Tullis
rule.32
In the Smith case27 the court held that divorce is a special action to
which statutes of limitations do not apply, and the child support order
could be enforced, although the wife waited until fourteen years after the
last installment was due before bringing the action.
Marriage
The only Supreme Court case in this area was State v. Gans, a criminal
case.2 s The parents took their 11-year-old daughter from Ohio to West
23. 153 N.E.2d 704 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957).
24. 153 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
25. 138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941).
26. Lowman v. Lowman, 166 Ohio St. 1, 6, 139 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1956); Seitz v.
Seitz, 156 Ohio St 516, 518, 103 N.E.2d 741, 743 (1952) (concurring opinion of
Taft, J.).
27. Smith v. Smith, 146 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), 4f'd, 168 Ohio St.
447 (1959).
28. 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958). The case is also discussed in the
CRIMINAL LAW section, sapra.
19591
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Virginia, where she lied about her age to get a license, was married and
returned to Ohio to live, all with the knowledge and consent of her par-
ents. Bride, groom, and parents were at all times domiciled in Ohio. The
parents were convicted of "acting in a way tending to cause delinquency
in such child" and the conviction was affirmed. Without commenting
on the merits of the criminal aspect of the case, it seems clear that the
decision does indirectly change the accepted law on non-age marriages.
The general rule is that a non-age marriage is valid in Ohio if valid where
made, and the court of appeals has held that where the non-age marriage
was valid where made, the husband could not be convicted of contrib-
uting to the juvenile delinquency of his 15-year-old wife.29 In the Gans
case the Supreme Court expressly declined to pass on the validity of the
marriage, although the dissenting opinion pointed out that under West
Virginia law it was valid. The interesting thing about the opinion is that
every argument the court uses to convict the parents of tending to cause
delinquency applies with equal force to the husband. If this analysis is
correct, we have the anomalous situation where the husband entering a
marriage which is valid in Ohio, can be jailed for so doing.
There are only two cases in Ohio on the validity of a contract in re-
straint of marriage, and one of these was decided last year. In Saslow v.
Saslow"0 the parties executed a separation agreement, later incorporated
in a divorce decree, which gave the house to the wife and provided that
if she remarried within three years of divorce she would convey the house
to the children of the first marriage. The wife sold the house, invested
the proceeds in a residence of equal value and remarried within three
years. On her refusal to convey the second house to the children she
was convicted of contempt of the divorce decree. The court held that
such a contract is valid where the purpose of the restraint on marriage is
to protect the children of a prior marriage. The court also held that an
equity court might follow the proceeds of the sale and impose a con-
structive trust for the benefit of the children, but this could not be done
by a divorce court in a contempt action, and the conviction was set aside.
Last year's Survey article pointed out that there is a marked attitude
of hostility towards common law marriages among the lower courts in
Ohio.3' A recent case exhibits the same tendency and held that the facts
failed to establish the marriage by clear and convincing evidence.3 2
29. Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931).
30. 147 N.E.2d 262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). The other Ohio case is King v. King,
63 Ohio St. 363, 59 N.E. 111 (1900).
31. See Lynch v. Romas, 139 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), noted in 1957
Survey, 9 WEST. RES. L. REv. 322 (1958), a case which applied a high standard
of proof and also barred the surviving spouse from testifying as to the marriage.
32. Brastein v. Sedivy, 153 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Prob. 1957).
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Adoption
In the Biddle case,33 the Supreme Court resolved a problem which has
caused considerable difficulty in the lower courts. The court held that
the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over adoption and can enter
a valid adoption order, even though the child is the ward of a common
pleas court which had divorced the child's parents and had reserved con-
tinuing jurisdiction over custody of the child.
Illegitimacy
There were a number of interesting lower court cases on illegitimacy.
The statute provides that an unmarried mother can file a paternity ac-
tion. 34 The phrase "unmarried mother" has not been construed by the
Supreme Court, but a 1949 court of appeals decision held that the plain-
tiff must be unmarried at the time of the filing of the action3 5 A recent
juvenile court opinion disagreed and held that where the mother was
single when the child was born, her marriage prior to filing the complaint
would not bar the action3 6
In a unique case of first impression, an ingenious attorney was able
to get around the marriage bar. Apparently the mother was already mar-
ried, both at the time of the birth and thereafter, so under any possible
construction of the paternity statute her claim would be barred. She
picked another and ultimately successful route to her objective. First
she sued as next friend of the child, asking for a declaratory judgment
adjudging that the child was in fact the illegitimate child of the defend-
ant.37 The mother then filed an action as a creditor, alleging that she
had furnished necessary support for the child of the defendant, and ask-
ing for reimbursement. The court held that the findings of paternity in
the first case were res judicata in the second case, and ordered reimburse-
ment.3
8
In Ohio as elsewhere, an illegitimate child can not inherit from his
father. However, a recent case holds that the child can inherit from a
father by affinity. The probate court held that where the mother married
a man who was not the father of the illegitimate child, and then prede-
ceased him, the child could inherit from him as a "step-child" '39
HUGH ALAN Ross
33. In re Biddies Adoption, 168 Ohio St. 209, 152 N.E.2d 105 (1958).
34. OHio Rnv. CODE § 3111.01.
35. Fischer v. McKinney, 85 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
36. Kirkbride v. Eschbaugh, 147 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1957).
37. Maiden v. Maiden, 153 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
38. Everett v. Maiden, 153 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
39. Kest v. State, 146 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio Prob. 1957).
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